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One of the most gripping story lines of recent years is the one in which after a crime is committed, law enforcement of-
ficials become so focused on “the obvious suspect” 
that they ignore evidence that may point them 
toward other suspects. After the suspect is convict-
ed, it has often taken decades before new forensic 
tools free “the obvious suspect” and identify some-
one else as responsible for the crime.
A similar story line is being played out in the 
debate over trade and the US farm program. Many 
of those looking for the reason for low commod-
ity prices are so focused on “the obvious suspect” 
(increased production resulting from US subsidies) 
that they ignore evidence that may lead them to 
consider other causes for the low prices.
The argument asserts that US subsidies have 
stimulated US farmers to produce a considerably 
greater crop volume than they would have without 
the subsidies. The result of this “overproduction” 
is lower prices that are harming farmers in other 
countries. In addition, many are authoritatively 
asserting that eliminating subsidies will result in 
lower production on the part of US producers and 
higher prices for all farmers. Based on this rea-
soning the argument calls either for putting out a 
contract (in the Godfather sense) on all subsidies 
or reassigning subsidies to a World Trade Organi-
zation (WTO) approved “good-works” environ-
mental and other “multifunctional” projects.
Over the last three columns we have presented evi-
dence challenging both the methodology and focus 
of a case that has the potential to be played out 
before a WTO disputes panel. The potential WTO 
case that has been laid out in several forms would 
involve a challenge by a soybean, corn, wheat, or 
exporting country asserting that US subsidies have 
encouraged overproduction resulting in lower 
prices.
Our first response was that in examining the 
impact of subsidies, one needs to take the lack of 
price responsiveness on the part of both producers 
and consumers into account. Because farmers are 
price-takers and not price-makers, most of them 
will tell you that they have every incentive to try to 
maximize production in order reduce the per-unit 
cost of production. That allows farmers to spread 
the high fixed costs out over a greater amount of 
production, as long as the price is above the vari-
able cost of production.
We then argued that the effect of subsidies cannot 
be looked at one crop at a time because most US 
farmers grow more than one crop and a reduction 
in corn plantings does not mean that the land will 
be left idle. Instead, acres shifted out of corn will 
be planted to soybeans or another crop, leaving 
total acreage relatively unchanged – this is the 
low price responsiveness that we talked about. 
At most, the subsidies may be responsible for a 
three-tenths of one percent change in production. 
Looking at the crops one at a time runs afoul of the 
fallacy of composition.
Last week we argued that with low price respon-
siveness, it is not the subsidies per se that are 
responsible for the low prices, but rather the 
“market-oriented” Loan Deficiency Payment/Mar-
keting Loan Gain (LDP/MLG) program. In fact the 
LDP/MLGs were designed to protect US producers 
while allowing the US price to drop to the world 
price. What the designers of this program failed to 
understand was that producers in other countries 
usually sell their crops for a discount off the US 
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price. As a result, LDP/MLGs have allowed prices 
to fall below the loan rate with most of the benefits 
being picked up by integrated cattle feeders, im-
porting countries, and the transporters and proces-
sors of grains and seeds.
Ignored in the discussion of trade distorting sub-
sidies is the impact of government funded agricul-
tural research and extension programs. In WTO 
parlance these payments are put in the green box 
and are considered non-trade distorting. We find it 
hard to understand how research programs which 
increase yield potential and decrease crop loss can 
be considered to have no impact on trade. By their 
very nature these programs result in increased pro-
duction and, in the presence of weak price respon-
siveness, lower prices.
We are not arguing for the elimination of agricul-
tural research and extension programs, but rather 
for recognition that the fruits of this research have 
had more impact on increasing the supply of food 
than farm subsidies. Since 1996, US corn and 
soybean yields have increased by 16 percent and 
much of this gain has its roots in basic research 
that can be tied to government funding.
If US subsidies are the cause of low prices, then 
we should see a different picture for those crops 
for which the US has no subsidies and no tariffs. 
Absent the presence of US programs these crops 
should have stable prices. Between 1980 and 
2002, cocoa prices fell by 58 percent, coffee prices 
fell by 70 percent and pepper prices fell by 32 
percent. Clearly US subsidies are not the cause of 
these low prices.
If both unsubsidized tropical crops and subsidized 
temperate zone crops have similar price/income 
problems, then maybe we should look at some-
thing other than “the obvious suspect:” subsidies. 
And that other suspect is the low price responsive-
ness for aggregate crop agriculture, both tropical 
and temperate.
On June 24, 2005, the Federal Register (at page 36,557) carried a Notice of Deter-mination by the Secretary of Agriculture 
that payments under the Conservation Security 
Program, under criteria specified in the USDA 
regulations, are “. . . primarily for the purpose of 
conserving soil and water resources or protect-
ing and restoring the environment.” The Secretary 
is charged with making such a determination in 
order for the payments to be eligible for the cost 
share exclusion available under federal income tax 
law. The Secretary of the Treasury is obligated to 
make a determination that the payments under the 
program do not increase “. . . substantially the an-
nual income derived from the property.”
The Secretary of Agriculture, in the June 24, 2005 
notice, proceeded to state that “. . . this determi-
nation permits recipients to exclude from gross 
income, for Federal income tax purposes, all or 
part of the existing practice, new practice, and 
enhancement activity payments under the extent 
allowed by the Internal Revenue Service.” Howev-
er, as discussed in a November 18, 2005 Agricul-
tural Law Digest article**, the exclusion provision 
is limited to “capital improvements.” Cost-share 
payments for the adoption of land-based structural 
practices should be eligible for the exclusion from 
income if the practice is a capital improvement.” 
Cost-share payments for the adoption or main-
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